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I.

INTRODUCTION

Arbitration is a common means of resolving commercial disputes. Although
arbitration is an attractive alternative to litigation, arbitration can be disadvantageous to a
potential plaintiff because of high costs.1 The United States Supreme Court endorsed a
“liberal … policy favoring arbitration agreements” whenever possible.2 However, a party is
often at a disadvantage upon signing an arbitration agreement when little understanding of
the agreement’s cost implications exist. Such scenarios can arise when negotiating adhesion
contracts or employee handbook agreements, and when they do arise, the question of
whether an agreement can be invalidated because of its cost implications must be answered
convincingly.
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the United States Supreme Court left open
the possibility of an arbitration agreement being invalidated because of prohibitive costs.3
However, the Green Tree Court did not comment on how detailed the showing of prohibitive
costs must be in order to do so.4 Instead, Green Tree ultimately leaves examination of specific
cost issues to the lower courts, and those lower courts must also decide the appropriate
standard for invalidating an agreement.5
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1 Michelle Eviston & Richard A. Bales, Capping the Costs of Consumer and Employment Arbitration, 42 U.
TOL. L. REV. 903, 903 (2011).
2 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
3 Green Tree Fin. Corp-Ala.. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
4 Id. at 92.
5 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 660 (6th Cir. 2003).
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The federal circuit courts take varying approaches on how to invalidate an
agreement based on cost.6 One circuit holds any agreement that places significant costs on
the party bringing the claim per se invalid.7 The majority of jurisdictions apply a case-by-case
analysis in determining whether to invalidate an agreement.8 However, two main approaches
exist in applying the case-by-case test.9 The first, adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, evaluates the cost impact of the agreement based on the individual party’s
situation.10 The second test, used by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applies the
case-by-case test by evaluating the cost impact to a similarly situated “group of plaintiffs.”11
This article argues that the best method of assessing prohibitive costs is the Sixth
Circuit’s case-by-case approach, which evaluates the cost to a similarly situated group of
potential plaintiffs.12 Part II of this article provides background on arbitration costs as
opposed to litigation costs, and examines the Green Tree opinion that set the stage for
possibly invalidating arbitration agreements based on prohibitive costs. Part III explains the
federal circuit split between the “group of plaintiffs” approach found in Morrison v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., and the “individual plaintiff” approach in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor
Systems, Inc.13 Part IV analyzes the specific advantages and disadvantages of the group-ofplaintiffs approach and the individual-plaintiff approach. Part V of this article concludes
that the best method of analyzing prohibitive costs is the Morrison group-of-plaintiffs
approach.14
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The FAA and the Supreme Court’s Preference For the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements

Arbitration has a long history in the English and American legal systems, despite the
fact that early courts disfavored resolving disputes through arbitration.15 Because judges in
English courts received pay based on the number of cases decided, they believed arbitration
would infringe on their ability to make money because they would decide fewer cases.16 In
Eviston and Bales, supra note 1, at 904.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 904.
9 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669; Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys. Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir.
2001).
10 Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557.
11 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669.
12 Id. at 663.
13 Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557.
14 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663.
15 JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2002).
16 Id.
6
7
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the early 1920s, the industrialization of the United States and the resulting increase in
disputes led to a push for viewing arbitration more favorably.17 Merchants who sought to
strengthen the effect of arbitration agreements within trade associations worked to enact the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).18 These trade associations had three main purposes for
supporting arbitration.19 First, the associations hoped to save money by lowering the costs
of dispute resolution through arbitration.20 Second, they hoped that arbitration would allow
industry insiders to supply the rules of decision in arbitration proceedings instead of judges
with little knowledge of trade practices.21 Third, associations preferred to have disputes
decided by members of their respective trades rather than by a judge with no particular
knowledge of industry practices.22 On February 12, 1925, their efforts culminated with
President Calvin Coolidge signing the FAA into law.23
The FAA meant to provide an alternative to the courts for resolving legal disputes.
Congress affirmed that at least part of the purpose for the FAA was to place arbitration
agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong.”24 By creating
the FAA, Congress hoped that many of the legal issues normally handled by litigation would
be more easily resolved in arbitration, so long as the agreements were valid and
enforceable.25
Recent Supreme Court decisions have gone even further and have created a strong
preference of enforcing the agreements in all types of claims.26 Even in cases involving
major public policy questions, arbitration agreements have been enforced.27 A number of
cases have made clear that all claims are subject to mandatory arbitration unless there is a
clear intent from Congress to bar the claim from the arbitral forum.28
B.

The Price of Arbitration vs. The Price of Litigation

Id.
David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How “Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration,” 8
NEV. L. J. 400, 403 (2007).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307
(1948)).
24 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
25 Id.
26 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 89 (2000).
27 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
28 Schwartz, supra note 18, at 407.
17
18
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Because many parties do not have unlimited liquid assets, the cost of resolving a
dispute is an important consideration and may be the deciding factor for whether to pursue a
claim.29 This section first describes the approximate cost of arbitration and then compares
the cost of arbitration to the cost of resolving a dispute in court. This article only describes
the “forum costs” of arbitration and litigation. Forum costs are costs a party must pay to
have a claim heard in a particular forum.30 Forum costs are only part of the “transactional
cost” of litigation, which also includes attorneys’ fees, discovery costs, expert witnesses, and
other expenses borne by a party regardless of the forum.31
1.

American Arbitration Association

The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), one provider of arbitration
services in the United States, charges both administrative fees and arbitrator fees in each
arbitration proceeding.32 The fees are listed in several different fee schedules and are
determined based on the damage amount sought and on the type of claim being arbitrated
(consumer, commercial, labor, or employment).33 This section evaluates the costs of two
types of arbitration proceedings commonly found in agreements entered into without any
meaningful negotiations: consumer and employment arbitration.
a.

Consumer Arbitration

Parties in a consumer contract dispute must pay both filing fees and arbitrator fees
to use the AAA for arbitration.34 The consumer and the business divide fees according to
the AAA schedule with fees based on the amount in controversy.35 If the amount in
controversy is less than $75,000, a desk-arbitration36 costs $250, and an in-person arbitration
hearing costs $750 per day.37 If the amount in question is over $75,000, the arbitrator’s fee is
the amount noted in the arbitrator’s AAA panel biography.38

See Morrison, 317 F.3d 646.
Public Citizen, Report on Costs of Arbitration 40 (2002).
31 Id.
32 See Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 907.
33 Consumer Arbitration Costs, Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrators, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_014025 [hereinafter
Consumer Arbitration Costs]; see also Employment Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS’N, 1,
(rules effective November 1, 2009) http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/
ADRSTG_004362&revision=latestreleased.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 A desk arbitration is where the case is decided based solely on the written documents, and no faceto-face hearing is held.
37 Consumer Arbitration Costs, supra note 34.
38 Id.
29
30
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Allocation of fees depends on the amount in controversy.39 As long as a claim or
counterclaim does not exceed $10,000, the consumer pays one half of the arbitrator’s fee up
to $125 and no administrative fees, while the business pays $975 in administrative fees plus
whatever remains of the arbitrator’s fee.40 If either party’s claim or counterclaim involves
between $10,000 and $75,000, the consumer pays one half of the arbitrator’s fee up to $375
and no administrative fees, while the business pays $1,275 in administrative fees (or only
$975 if a hearing does not occur) and the remainder of the arbitrator’s fee.41 Thus, for
disputes involving less than $75,000 the consumer could pay up to $375 of the arbitrator’s
fee with the business paying all remaining costs.42
However, proceedings become significantly more expensive when the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 or when a non-monetary issue is the subject of the dispute.43
Claims and counterclaims exceeding $75,000 require parties to pay fees according to the
Commercial Fee Schedule.44 According to the Commercial Fee Schedule, the filing party
pays the fees, and fees vary based on the amount in controversy.45 For example, a claim
involving $300,000 requires the filing party to pay an initial “filing fee” of $4,350 and a “final
fee” of $1,750.46 The final fee is due at the first hearing.47 A filing party in a non-monetary
claim must pay a filing fee of $3,350 and a final fee of $1,250.48 In addition to administrative
fees, each party must pay half of the arbitrator’s fee and half of the other fees incurred. 49
Thus, a party seeking arbitration for claims of over $75,000 or in non-monetary disputes can
face significant costs to pursue the claim.
b.

Employment Arbitration

When an arbitration request in the employment setting is first filed, the AAA makes
an initial administrative determination to determine whether the dispute arises from an
employer-promulgated plan or an individually negotiated employment agreement or
contract.50 According to AAA rules, “[t]his determination is made by reviewing the
documentation provided to the AAA by the parties, including, but not limited to, the
Id.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 909.
44 Consumer Arbitration Costs, supra note 34.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Commercial Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS’N, (rules effective June 1, 2009),
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Employment Arbitration Rules, supra note 34.
39
40

62

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 14

demand for arbitration, the parties' arbitration program or agreement, and any employment
agreements or contracts between the parties.”51 Determining the type of agreement is
necessary because the fee-schedule differs for each type.52 Parties in any type of
employment arbitration agreement could agree to a different cost allocation scheme than the
default rules of the AAA.53
In an “employer promulgated plan,” an employee’s fees are limited. The employee
pays only $175 for the filing fee.54 The employer bears most of the burden when it compels
arbitration through company policy, and must pay the remainder of the filing fee, the
arbitrator’s fees, hearing fees, room rental fees, and any other expenses.55
If AAA classifies the dispute as a dispute arising from an individually negotiated
employment agreement, the Commercial Fee Schedule applies.56 The amount in controversy
affects the amount of money that the filing party must pay.57 Unlike in consumer
arbitration, there is no “small claim” provision that caps the filing party’s expenses for
smaller claims.58 In the employment setting, the filing party bears the administrative fees
according to the fee schedule no matter how small the amount of actual damages being
sought.59 A party seeking actual damages of $1 must pay $975 in administrative expenses.60
In a larger claim such as a Title VII claim where actual damages sought might amount to
$300,000, the filing party must pay $6,100 in administrative expenses.61 In addition to
administrative expenses, if the arbitration agreement is an individually negotiated contract
outside of the employment agreement, the parties must split all other associated costs,
including arbitrator’s fees, room rental and expenses.62 Beyond just estimating the costs
based on the fee schedule, one court cited to a Public Citizen Study that found the costs of
arbitrating an $80,000 claim could be as high as $11,625.63
To summarize, determining the type of claim being arbitrated is critical to accurately
anticipating costs. The system for determining the type of agreement is fairly subjective, and
as a result, prospective litigants will assume the worst-case scenario before filing.64 If a
Id.
Id.
53 Id. at 42.
54 Id. at 40.
55 Id. at 41.
56
Id. at 42.
57 Id. at 44.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 45.
63 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669; Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 9.
64 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 665.
51
52
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prospective litigant faces the possibility of paying high arbitration costs, the litigant might
not file the claim.
c.

Fee Waivers and Other Means of Moving Costs

The AAA offers fee waiver for those who meet certain economic criteria.65 A party
may be considered for fee waiver if its annual gross income is below 200% of the federal
poverty line.66 The annual poverty line for a family of four in the lower 48 states is $22,350,
and $10, 890 for a single person. 67 Despite the financial guideline, the AAA reserves the
right to approve or deny any hardship requests it wishes.68 Once a party has demonstrated
its need for a waiver through affidavits and other evidence, the AAA may appoint a single
pro bono arbitrator for a one-day hearing.69
2.

Other Providers of Arbitration

In addition to the AAA, two other major providers of arbitration services are the
National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services/Endispute (“JAMS”).70 The fee procedures for the other arbitration providers are
mostly comparable with the basic structure of the AAA’s fee schedule.71 For example, the
NAF requires the filing party to pay fees, although three fees are required instead of two.72
For a filing party seeking $300,000 in actual damages, the fees for the NAF arbitration are a
$500 filing fee, a $500 commencement fee, and a $1,000 administrative fee, for a total of
$2,000.73 In addition to these fees, the party requesting the hearing pays the arbitrator’s
fees.74 NAF charges fees for other small items like discovery requests and written reports.75
While NAF costs appear smaller than AAA on their face, a 2002 Public Citizen Study found
that total costs with NAF greatly exceeded costs in comparison to AAA.76

Consumer Arbitration Costs, supra note 34.
Id.
67 2011 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/11poverty.shtml [hereinafter Poverty
Guidelines].
68 Consumer Arbitration Costs, supra note 34.
69 Id.
70 Public Citizen, Report on Costs of Arbitration 40 (2002).
71
NAF
Fee
Schedule,
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/2008FeeScheduleFinalPrint1.pdf .
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Public Citizen, Report on Costs of Arbitration 42 (2002).
65
66
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The Cost of Litigating a Case in Court

Traditional court-based litigation results in three primary costs: attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and forum costs.77 This section examines each of the three primary costs
in more detail and discusses their impact on parties to a claim.
A party entering into litigation usually pays some type of attorney’s fees unless the
party is litigating pro se. Attorney’s fees are often costly, especially in cases where complex
discovery is required, and contingency fee arrangements in such cases are common.78 Of
course, the key advantage of contingency fee arrangements is in eliminating “pay as you go”
attorney fees, which allows for litigation with little, if any, continuous out-of-pocket expense.
Second, parties typically pay “litigation expense” fees. These fees usually include
travel, expert witnesses, and other expenses associated with litigation.79 There is no specific
data showing whether litigation expenses are higher in court versus arbitration.80 A party’s
attorney normally pays the up-front costs of litigation expenses until the case is resolved.81
The third cost to a party in a court dispute is the forum fees. The forum fee to get
an action into federal court consists of only the filing fee.82 For a party to file a claim in
Federal court, the cost is $350.83 Unlike in arbitration conducted by the AAA, a court’s fee
schedule is not based on the amount in controversy, and there no cost difference exists
between different types of claims.84
Forum fees are the primary cost difference between resolving claims in arbitration
versus traditional litigation. For example, a party seeking $300,000 in actual damages on a
Title VII employment claim faces payment of $6,100 in administrative expenses, in addition
to half the arbitration fees, just to file and proceed through the arbitration forum.85
Moreover, the party would still be responsible for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
upon resolution of the claim.86 Contrast this reality with the same party paying only $350 to
get into federal court plus whatever agreed-upon fee arrangement exists between party and

Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 912.
Public Citizen, Report on Costs of Arbitration 4-5 (2002).
79 Id.
80 Christopher R. Drazohal, Arbitration Costs & Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 736
(2006).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See i.e. Fee Schedule, http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/feeschedule.htm.
84 Id.
85 Employment Arbitration Rules, supra note 34.
86 Id.
77
78
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attorney.87 This often-significant cost differential may be enough to deter a party from
pursuing valid legal claims.88
C.
1.

Judicial Treatment of Excessive Costs

Green Tree and Invalidation of Arbitration Agreements Based on Cost

As noted previously, high costs for a party choosing or forced to resolve a dispute in
arbitration might deter pursuit resolution of valid legal claims.89 In the 2000 decision Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the United State Supreme Court faced the question of
whether prohibitive costs could invalidate an arbitration agreement.90 Although Green Tree
arose out of a consumer claim, its principles relating to arbitration agreements are broadly
applicable.91
In Green Tree, Larketta Randolph financed a mobile home through Green Tree
Financial Corporation.92 The financing agreement contained an arbitration clause providing
that “all disputes arising from, or relating to, the contract, whether arising under case law or
statutory law, [must] be resolved [in] binding arbitration.” 93 The clause was silent regarding
which party would bear the costs of arbitration.94
Randolph sued Green Tree in federal court alleging Green Tree violated the Truth
in Lending Act (“TILA”)95 by failing to disclose charges in Randolph’s loan.96 Randolph
also amended her claim to allege a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act97 because
of the arbitration requirement on her statutory claim.98 After Randolph filed suit, the district
court granted a motion filed by Green Tree to compel arbitration.99 Randolph appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the district court’s order to
compel arbitration.100 The Eleventh Circuit found issue with the agreement’s silence
regarding which party would bear the costs of arbitration.101 The court held that the
Fee Schedule, supra note 92.
Morrision, 317 F.3d at 665.
89 Id. at 664.
90 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 82.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 82-83.
94 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 84.
95 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93 (2012).
96 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 83.
97 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (2012).
98 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 83.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 84.
101 Id.
87
88

66

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 14

agreement was unenforceable because the risk of “steep” arbitration costs to Randolph
interfered with her ability to effectively vindicate her statutory claims.102 The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari to review the case.103
At the Supreme Court, Randolph argued that she could not vindicate her statutory
rights because she was highly likely to incur significant costs in arbitration.104 Randolph
reasoned that the agreement’s silence regarding costs created a significant risk that she would
be obligated to pay a large sum of money.105 The Court acknowledged that large arbitration
costs might deter someone from vindicating their statutory rights, but the Court noted a lack
of evidence to support the notion that Randolph would actually bear the costs if the case
proceeded to arbitration.106 The Court held that the mere risk of Randolph being saddled
with the costs was too speculative to justify finding the arbitration agreement
unenforceable.107 The Court further held that invalidating the agreement on such grounds
went against their own endorsed liberal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.108 Additionally, the Court held that “where…a party seeks to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that
party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs,” and that
Randolph did not meet that burden.109
Although the Supreme Court did not invalidate the particular agreement in Green
Tree based upon prohibitive costs,110 the Court did leave open the possibility that other
agreements could be invalidated based upon cost issues.111 However, the Court did not
provide direction on how detailed the showing of prohibitive expenses must be for a court
to invalidate an agreement.112 The lack of guidance in this area has led to varying approaches
by lower courts,113 and a need exists for the Supreme Court to adopt a consistent approach.
2.

The Per Se Rule

Since Green Tree, one circuit still holds that arbitration agreements containing feesplitting provisions requiring a plaintiff to pay any part of the arbitrator’s fee make the

Id.
Id.
104 Id at 90.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 91.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 92.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 90.
112 Id. at 92.
113 Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 915.
102
103
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agreement per se unenforceable.114 In Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, Saint Clair Adams
applied for a job at Circuit City and signed an arbitration agreement upon being hired. 115
The agreement required Adams to potentially pay half of the arbitrator’s fees in the event of
arbitration.116 A dispute ensued, and Adams sued Circuit City alleging discrimination among
other state claims.117 When before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court
held that requiring an employee to pay even part of the arbitrator’s fees makes an agreement
unenforceable as a matter of law.118 The court based its reasoning on the idea that a person
should not be required to pay the fees or expenses of an arbitrator any more than a person is
required to pay the salary of a judge hearing claims.119 However, it is important to note that
only the Ninth Circuit follows a per se rule.120 Most other courts now follow the case-by-case
rule discussed in the next section of this article.121
3.

Case-by-Case Rule

Most courts evaluate the prohibitive costs of arbitration using a case-by-case
Although most courts agree that the case-by-case inquiry is the most appropriate,
two variations of the case-by-case test have emerged.123 One approach focuses on the
financial situation of the specific party involved in the dispute, while the other focuses on
the impact of cost provisions on similarly situated individuals, not just the particular party in
the litigation.124 The next section of this article explains the difference in approaches in
more detail.
analysis.122

III.

CIRCUIT SPLIT

In Green Tree, the Supreme Court hinted at applying a case-by-case standard for
invalidating an arbitration agreement based on prohibitive costs, but the Court never
squarely adopted such a test.125 However, most federal courts of appeal use a variation of
the case-by-case test (with the exception of the Ninth Circuit). Even so, a circuit split exists

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 891.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 892.
118 Id. at 894.
119 Id.
120 Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 915.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Eviston & Bales, supra note 1, at 917.
124 Id. at 920.
125 Green Tree Fin. Corp, 531 U.S. at 92.
114
115
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on to the proper application of the case-by-case rule.126 This section explains the two
predominant methods of applying the case-by-case analysis.
A.

Bradford’s Individual Plaintiff Case-by-Case Analysis

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted its version of the case-by-case
analysis in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems Inc.127 More specifically, the court
answered the question of whether arbitration agreements with cost-splitting provisions
should be found invalid regardless of the circumstances of the case.128
John Bradford worked for Brooktree Corporation (“Brooktree”) in 1996 while
Brooktree was in the process of being acquired by Rockwell Semiconductor Systems Inc.
(“Rockwell”).129 As a condition of employment, Bradford signed a “Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate Claims.”130 The agreement included statutory claims.131 The agreement also
provided that the parties “share equally” the fees and costs of the arbitrator.132 The stated
purpose of the fee-splitting arrangement was “[t]o ensure that the Arbitrator is not biased in
any way in favor of one party because that party is paying all or most of the … costs.”133
The dispute arose when Rockwell discontinued Bradford’s employment.134
Bradford believed his discharge was based on age discrimination and undertook two legal
actions: first, a demand to arbitrate based on an alleged violation of an age discrimination
statute,135 and second, a lawsuit alleging discrimination.136 The arbitrator ruled against
Bradford’s demand to arbitrate.137 Nearly simultaneously, the district court granted summary
judgment against Bradford in the lawsuit.138 In granting summary judgment, the court held
that Bradford failed to show that the arbitration agreement’s cost-splitting provision made
the agreement unenforceable because of the financial hardship it caused him.139
Bradford appealed the district court’s ruling to the Fourth Circuit, arguing on appeal
that the fee-splitting provisions contained in the arbitration agreement made the agreement

See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 557; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 658.
Bradford, 238 F.3d at 559.
128 Id. at 554.
129 Id. at 551.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 551-52.
137 Id. at 551.
138 Id. at 552.
139 Id.
126
127

2012]

DETERMINING THE PROPER STANDARD FOR INVALIDATING
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BASED ON HIGH PROHIBITIVE COSTS

69

invalid as a matter of law.140 Bradford maintained that provisions creating a risk of high cost
to an employee could deter victims of discrimination from vindicating their legal rights
effectively.141 Bradford also argued that forcing employees to arbitrate their claims
undermined the deterrent and remedial functions of the federal anti-discrimination
statutes.142 He further contended that employees who cannot afford the up-front cost of
arbitration are unable to vindicate their statutory rights.143 As a secondary argument,
Bradford argued that he had shown enough personal hardship and financial deterrence that
the agreement should not be enforced against him, even if the agreement was not per se
unenforceable.144
The court rejected Bradford’s position that arbitration agreements containing feesplitting provisions were per se invalid, reasoning that the critical inquiry is whether the
arbitration forum is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation.145 Thus, the court’s
chief concern focused on whether the individual party possesses an adequate ability to
effectively vindicate statutory rights.146
The court declined to hold agreements
unenforceable as a matter of law because circumstances in each case are different with
respect to each plaintiff’s situation.147
After rejecting the per se rule, the court applied a case-by-case test to determine
whether Bradford was, in fact, deterred from vindicating his statutory claims.148 Applying its
interpretation of Green Tree, the court held that each plaintiff holds the burden of proving
that their claims are not suitable for arbitration.149 The court looked at three issues to decide
how the claimant properly meets the burden of proof. First, the court evaluates the
individual claimant’s ability to pay.150 Second, the court analyzes the expected cost
differential between arbitration and litigation, and whether it deters the bringing of claims.151
Finally, the court decides if the difference in cost is so significant that it would deter parties
from bringing claims .152

Id.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556.
146 Id. at 557.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 557-58.
149 Id. at 556.
150 Id. at 558.
151 Id. at 558.
152 Id.
140
141
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Morrison’s Group of Plaintiffs Case-by-Case Analysis

In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
created a revised case-by-case analysis that evaluated the possible “chilling effect” of the
cost-splitting provision on similarly-situated plaintiffs rather than just on the party actually
involved in the dispute.153 Morrison consolidated two cases involving terminated employees
who sued their employers for discrimination. In both situations, the employers attempted to
compel arbitration.154 For the purposes of this section, since the two fact patterns in the
consolidated case are largely similar, only the facts of the Morrison situation will be
discussed.
Lillian Pebbles Morrison was a highly qualified candidate155 applying for a
managerial position at a Circuit City store in Cincinnati, Ohio.156 During the application
process, Morrison signed a “Dispute Resolution Agreement” that required arbitration for all
disputes arising out of her employment with Circuit City.157 The agreement included all state
and federal statutory claims, tort claims, and contract claims.158 Any claims proceeded under
a company manual called the “Circuit City Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures.”159
The rules included a cost-splitting clause that required Morrison to pay a $75 filing fee,160 as
well as half the costs of the arbitration unless the arbitrator used discretionary powers to
require one party pay more.161
Circuit City hired Morrison in December of 1995 and fired her two years later.162
After her termination, Morrison sued Circuit City alleging race and sex discrimination.163
Circuit City removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration. 164
The district court granted Circuit City’s motion to compel, and Morrison appealed to the
Sixth Circuit.165
On appeal, Morrison argued the cost-splitting provisions contained in the agreement
denied her from being able to vindicate her statutory rights.166 The court first addressed
Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663.
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whether to apply a per se approach.167 The court rejected the argument that cost-splitting
provisions make an arbitration agreement per se invalid and interpreted Green Tree to require a
case-by-case approach in determining whether an individual agreement’s cost schemes
interfered with a vindication of legal rights.168
The court next looked for guidance on how to apply a case-by-case test, and
evaluated the Fourth Circuit’s Bradford approach.169
While acknowledging the
appropriateness of the case-by-case analysis, the court identified two negative aspects of the
Fourth Circuit’s application.170 First, the court reasoned that a plaintiff’s ability to concretely
estimate the projected costs of a dispute at the dispute’s commencement is difficult.171
Instead, the court considered the possibility of using a post-hoc judicial review of arbitration
awards to protect the plaintiff from high costs.172 However, the court ultimately rejected the
idea of judicial review because of its narrowness, and because once a party undergoes
arbitration, the party already assumes the risk of incurring the costs.173 The problem for the
claimant arises on the front end of the dispute when he or she is using cost as a factor in
deciding whether or not to file the claim.174 Reviewing costs after arbitration places the
claimant in a “Catch-22,” because once proceedings conclude, the claimant is already too far
down the path of having to pay and cannot turn back.175 The court also believed that the
Fourth Circuit’s Bradford analysis did not adequately protect the deterrent functions of federal
anti-discrimination statutes.176
After evaluating the various standards for invalidating the agreements, the court
adopted a “revised case-by-case approach.”177 The court held potential litigants needed an
opportunity to show that potential costs of arbitration deterred the litigants and other
similarly situated plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights if forced to arbitrate. 178
This approach most significantly differed from the Bradford approach by evaluating the
“chilling effect” of enforcing the agreement upon similarly situated potential plaintiffs, rather
than by evaluating only the individual plaintiff’s situation.179 The court preferred this
approach because it better addressed protection of the deterrent functions of antiId. at 658-59.
Id. at 659.
169 Id. at 660.
170 Id.
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discrimination statutes by looking at the impact of arbitration agreements on the people the
statute is designed to protect.180
Next, the court addressed how to decide whether deterrence from vindicating rights
actually occurred as a result of the cost-splitting provisions in the arbitration agreement.181
The court held that any court reviewing cost arrangements should look to “average or
typical” arbitration costs and the difference between the cost of arbitration and the cost of
litigation because the party will do the same.182 In reviewing the costs, the court should also
discount the possibility that the party may not be required to pay based on fee shifting or if a
claim is successful on the merits.183 The court’s analysis should focus on the “worst-case
scenario” because most parties will err on the side of caution and not take the risk of
incurring significant fees by filing a claim.184
The final issue in the Morrison case was severability.185 Because the agreement
contained a severability clause, the court followed state contract law in determining whether
or not the cost-allocation clause could be severed from the agreement, and severed the costsplitting scheme from the arbitration agreement.186 In the case, arbitration had already
occurred due to an outside agreement, and Morrison did not have to pay any costs, so the
arbitration award was upheld.187
Ultimately, the court held Morrison met the burden in showing that the costsplitting provisions would deter her and similarly situated plaintiffs from pursuing their
claims in the arbitral forum.188 During its analysis, the court evaluated what arbitration
would cost each plaintiff and found the cost high enough to deter them and similarly
situated plaintiffs from filing their claims.189
Thus, the Morrison court evaluated the impact of the cost-splitting provision on both
the party involved and a class of similarly situated potential claimants, finding that although
Morrison showed financial hardship, she was compelled to arbitrate due to a severability
clause that allowed the agreement to be enforced without the cost-splitting provision.190
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ANALYSIS

This section of the article first addresses the two negative aspects of the Bradford
approach as that evaluates each individual plaintiff’s situation separately, as identified by the
Sixth Circuit. It then addresses how Morrison’s “group of plaintiffs” approach provides
solutions to those two issues. Finally, it argues that the Morrison approach is the bestreasoned way to apply the case-by-case analysis.
A.

The Two Problems With the Individualized-Plaintiff Approach

The individualized-plaintiff approach in Bradford creates two primary problems.
First, in the initial stages of proceedings, it is very difficult for a plaintiff to accurately project
potential costs. Second, the individualized-plaintiff approach does not adequately protect
the deterrent functions of anti-discrimination statutes. This section examines each of the
two problems in detail.
1.

Plaintiff’s Difficulty in Determining Concrete Costs

The first problem with the individualized-plaintiff approach is the difficulty for of
accurately projecting arbitration costs at the outset of a claim. Some relatively concrete
numbers seem necessary to pass the Bradford test.191 The Bradford court required analysis of
the plaintiff’s expected cost of arbitration and the difference between the cost of arbitration
and the cost of traditional litigation.192 In cases where a party seeks to invalidate an
arbitration agreement because of prohibitive costs, the party bears the burden to
demonstrate why the costs warrant invalidation of the agreement.193 A party will have a
difficulty meeting its burden of proof under the Bradford analysis because at the outset of
proceedings, it may be impossible to obtain a good grasp of what the ultimate costs might
be.
Cost ambiguity in arbitration agreements makes it very difficult to apply the
individualized-plaintiff analysis in Bradford. Green Tree’s holding that silence on costs was not
enough to show the risk of incurring prohibitive costs set the stage for plaintiffs
experiencing difficulty in proving prohibitive costs.194 For example, consider an arbitration
agreement that allows for different arbitration providers, contains ambiguous language as to
how many arbitrators would hear the case, and contains ambiguity involving the possibility
of shifting of attorney’s fees. A party in such a situation would experience significant
difficulty calculating a concrete projected cost in order to meet the burden under the
Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556.
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individualized-plaintiff approach. In this case, great potential exists for a party to end up
with a very high cost burden, and the party proving what the real cost risk might be is a
speculative exercise at best. Most people faced with this decision would likely err on the side
of caution and not pursue any claim.195 Even in less ambiguous agreements, a party may still
experience difficulty in calculating potential costs because at the beginning of proceedings
(and prior to discovery), a party may not know the size or complexity of the issue at hand.
Without such information, a claimant cannot produce good estimates of potential costs.
2.

The Individualized-Plaintiff Approach Fails to Protect the Deterrent Function of
Anti-Discrimination Statutes

By potentially allowing deterrence of a large number of plaintiffs, the individualized-plaintiff
approach also fails to protect the deterrent function of anti-discrimination statutes.196 An
agreement that deters a large group of potential litigants should be held unenforceable. 197
Based on this view, if a court merely looks at an individual plaintiff’s financial situation
instead of the possible “chilling effect” any given type of arbitration agreement might
exercise over a larger group of potential litigants, the court’s analysis would not protect an
anti-discrimination statute’s deterrent function.
Disputes arising out of statutory claims may go through arbitration as long as
arbitration allows a plaintiff to effectively vindicate their statutory rights.198 In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court held that anti-discrimination statutes serve
two purposes: remediation and deterrence.199 The remedial function of anti-discrimination
statutes serves to make the plaintiff whole from injuries suffered as a result of a violation. 200
Additionally, the deterrent function serves to protect a much larger group of potential
plaintiffs by “deter[ing] conduct which has been identified as contrary to public policy and
harmful to society as a whole.”201
Even so, the issue of critical importance that Bradford’s individual-plaintiff test fails
to address is that if a court’s analysis of an arbitration agreement is based only on the
situation of the plaintiff involved in the litigation, it may miss the fact that a cost-splitting
provision interferes with the deterrent function for the rest of the group that an antidiscrimination statute is designed to protect.202 Although one plaintiff may be able to absorb
the costs and not be deterred from filing a claim, other plaintiffs protected by the statute
Morrison, 317 F.3d at 665.
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may not be able to afford to do the same. If only the single plaintiff’s situation is assessed,
the larger impact of the cost-provision and the potential chilling effect it may have on
litigation may never be known.
B.

Post Hoc Judicial Review as an Alternative Approach

Several courts have hinted at the attractiveness of using post hoc judicial review to
guarantee the adequacy of the arbitral forum.203 Those courts reason that if the issue is
whether the costs of arbitration make the arbitral forum too expensive, then determining the
actual costs after arbitration is complete would be far easier than forcing plaintiffs and
reviewing courts to “speculate” beforehand about potential costs.204
Although judicial review may seem attractive, there are two primary arguments
against it. First, a party faces a nearly impossible task in showing that arbitration costs
actually deterred them after the claim is filed and arbitrated.205 If a party proceeds through
arbitration and receives a bill, it seems that a court would likely conclude that the party was
not deterred since it actually pursued the claim. The Morrison court reasoned that deterrence
occurs early in the process:206 “If we [are not able to resolve] the ultimate cost-splitting
question until the end, we [will] know who has lost from the beginning…[and that is the
plaintiffs who were] deterred from initiating their claims at all.”207
Second, most parties faced with high up-front costs will err on the side of caution
and not file a claim.208 Parties considering bringing claims will look at the worst-case
scenario for potential cost.209 If a party is forced to arbitrate first, pay later, and then have
judicial review, the party bears the risk of arbitrating, paying a potentially significant bill, and
then potentially losing in judicial review. For this reason, the party faces a very difficult
position and will likely abstain from filing a claim.210 Because of this “Catch-22” situation,
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after-the-fact judicial review of arbitration costs does not adequately protect the deterrent
function of anti-discrimination statutes.
C.

The Morrison Group Approach’s Benefits

This section discusses two main reasons why the Morrison approach is ideal for
determining if an arbitration agreement should be invalidated due to high prohibitive costs.
It then discusses the primary counter argument against the Morrison group-of-plaintiffs
approach.
First, the Morrison approach is the most effective means to protect the deterrent
functions of anti-discrimination statutes. As opposed to Bradford’s individualized approach,
the Morrison approach looks at the “chilling effect” on a group of potential plaintiffs.211 The
“group-of-plaintiffs” approach should be preferred over the “individual-plaintiff approach”
because it eliminates the possibility that one plaintiff’s personal situation can effectively
produce precedential value for an entire class of claims. Just because one plaintiff might not
be deterred does not mean that a similar arbitration agreement would not deter other
plaintiffs. The point of ensuring the deterrent function of the statute is not undermined has
nothing to do with a particular plaintiff’s situation, but rather with the impact of the costsplitting provision in the aggregate.
The second reason Morrison should enjoy preference is because it places less
importance on the individual employee’s financial situation and instead looks at the financial
situation of the group of employees as a whole. The Morrison inquiry focuses on the
individual plaintiff’s personal situation only as representative of the class.212 Morrison takes
into account factors such as job description and socioeconomic background to identify a
class of “similarly situated [plaintiffs].”213 This is more effective because it prevents the
possibility “outliers” such as a wealthy plaintiff existing among a group of less wealthy
plaintiffs. If the inquiry is on an individual’s situation, and the individual happens to be very
wealthy, an agreement might be found valid when in the cases of many other identically
situated employees, the exact same agreement would deter pursuit of claims.
However, the Morrison approach might be arguably contrary to some of the language
in Green Tree. The Green Tree Court held that the risk that of the claimant being saddled with
prohibitive costs was too speculative to justify invalidating the agreement.214 This language
might arguably suggest that the Court made, or would have made, its assessment based on
Randolph’s particular situation. If this reading of Green Tree is accurate, the Morrison
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approach could be inconsistent with Green Tree. On the other hand, Green Tree also contains
language indicating that the Court evaluated how “claimants” fare under the Green Tree
arbitration clause.215 This language might suggest that the Court at least evaluated the impact
to a group of potential litigants.
V.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration agreements are becoming increasingly common across the United States
as an alternative to resolving disputes through traditional litigation. However, some studies
suggest that “forum costs” of arbitration are significantly higher than resolving the same
claim in court.216 When required to accept arbitration agreements with very little negotiating
power, it is critical that plaintiffs enjoy some kind of protection from the possibility of
incurring very high arbitration fees, which may prevent them accesses to a proper forum for
exercising their legal rights.
In Green Tree, the Supreme Court suggested that an arbitration agreement may be
invalidated because of high prohibitive costs. In determining when such invalidation is
appropriate, the majority of lower courts use a case-by-case approach to figure out when
cost is prohibitive enough to cause an arbitration agreement to be unenforceable. 217
Currently, the circuit courts of appeal are split as to whether the proper analysis must assess
the financial situation of a particular plaintiff involved in the dispute or the financial
situation(s) of a broader group of similarly situated litigants.218
This article argues that courts should follow the analytical approach modeled by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Morrison that assesses the potentially deterrent
nature of arbitration costs based on how it might impact a larger group of similarly situated
potential plaintiffs. Assessing prohibitive costs in this manner best protects the deterrent
functions of anti-discrimination statutes. Furthermore, using this approach provides the
most protection to plaintiffs who could potentially be deterred from filing their claims if the
arbitration agreement is enforced against them.
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